Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics

William H. Sandholm

doi:10.3934/jdg.2014.1.485

Article Contents

2014, Volume 1, Issue 3: 485-495. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.485

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Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics

William H. Sandholm^1,

1.
Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706

Received: October 31, 2012

Revised: June 30, 2013

Published: June 2014

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Abstract

We consider the stability of strict equilibrium under deterministic evolutionary game dynamics. We show that if the correlation between strategies' growth rates and payoffs is positive and bounded away from zero in a neighborhood of a strict equilibrium, then this equilibrium is locally stable.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 37C70, 91A22; Secondary: 37C10, 91A10.

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