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October  2016, 3(4): 355-369. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2016019

Conflict, private and communal property

Pablo Sánchez 1, and  Jaume Sempere 1,

1. 

Al Ajusco 20, México City, 10740 México, D.F., Mexico, Mexico

Received  December 2015 Revised  May 2016 Published  October 2016

This paper develops a model where agents can create private property rights on a resource by making appropriative activities. We show that the value of the resource has a non-monotonic effect on the emergence of private property. When the resource is sufficiently valuable, agents have an incentive to leave a sharing agreement and private property can appear. However if the value of the resource increases beyond a given threshold, deviations from the sharing agreement leads to a very costly confrontation. In this case, private property is not sustainable. Our analysis also finds that population size has an important effect on the size of the parameter set in which private property is sustainable.
Keywords: coalition formation., conflict, Private property.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B99, 91A1.
Citation: Pablo Sánchez, Jaume Sempere. Conflict, private and communal property. Journal of Dynamics & Games, 2016, 3 (4) : 355-369. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2016019
References:
[1]

A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, The property rights paradigm, Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), 16-27. doi: 10.1017/S0022050700076403.  Google Scholar

[2]

A. Bogomolnaia and M. Jackson, The stability of hedonic coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002), 201-230. doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0877.  Google Scholar

[3]

F. Bloch, Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff Division, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 90-123. doi: 10.1006/game.1996.0043.  Google Scholar

[4]

F. Bloch, Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (ed. M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas), Oxford University Press, 2011. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0020.  Google Scholar

[5]

M. S. Y. Chwe, Farsighted coalition stability, Journal of Economic Theory, 63 (1994), 299-325. doi: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1044.  Google Scholar

[6]

D. de Meza and J. R. Gould, The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 561-580. Google Scholar

[7]

H. Demsetz, Towards a theory of property rights, Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, 3 (2000), 163-177. doi: 10.1057/9780230523210_9.  Google Scholar

[8]

M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas, Economics of conflict: An overview, in Handbook of Defense Economics (ed. T. Sandler and K. Hartley), Vol 2., Elsevier (2007). doi: 10.2139/ssrn.895307.  Google Scholar

[9]

H. Grossman, The Creation of effective property rights, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 347-352. doi: 10.1257/aer.91.2.347.  Google Scholar

[10]

S. Hart and M. Kurz, Endogenous formation of coalitions, Econometrica, 51 (1983), 1047-1064. doi: 10.2307/1912051.  Google Scholar

[11]

T. Miceli and D. Lueck, Property Law, in Handbook of Law and Economics (ed. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell), Elsevier, 2007. Google Scholar

[12]

R. Posner, Economic analysis of the law, Stanford Law Review, 26 (1974), p711. doi: 10.2307/1227682.  Google Scholar

[13]

D. Ray and R. Vohra, A theory of endogenous coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 26 (1999), 286-336. doi: 10.1006/game.1998.0648.  Google Scholar

[14]

D. Ray and R. Vohra, Farsighted stable set, Econometrica, 83 (2015), 977-1011. doi: 10.3982/ECTA12022.  Google Scholar

[15]

S. Sanchez-Pages, On the social efficiency of conflict, Economics Letters, 90 (2006), 96-101. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.011.  Google Scholar

[16]

S. Sanchez-Pages, Rivalry, exclusion and coalitions, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9 (2007), 809-830. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00333.x.  Google Scholar

[17]

S. Skaperdas, Cooperation and conflict in the absence of property rights, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 720-739. Google Scholar

[18]

S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions, Economic Theory, 7 (1996), 283-290. doi: 10.1007/BF01213906.  Google Scholar

[19]

J. Umbeck, Might makes rights: A theory of the foundation and initial distribution of property rights, Economic Inquiry, 19 (1981), 38-59. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00602.x.  Google Scholar

show all references

References:
[1]

A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, The property rights paradigm, Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), 16-27. doi: 10.1017/S0022050700076403.  Google Scholar

[2]

A. Bogomolnaia and M. Jackson, The stability of hedonic coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002), 201-230. doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0877.  Google Scholar

[3]

F. Bloch, Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff Division, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 90-123. doi: 10.1006/game.1996.0043.  Google Scholar

[4]

F. Bloch, Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (ed. M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas), Oxford University Press, 2011. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0020.  Google Scholar

[5]

M. S. Y. Chwe, Farsighted coalition stability, Journal of Economic Theory, 63 (1994), 299-325. doi: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1044.  Google Scholar

[6]

D. de Meza and J. R. Gould, The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 561-580. Google Scholar

[7]

H. Demsetz, Towards a theory of property rights, Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, 3 (2000), 163-177. doi: 10.1057/9780230523210_9.  Google Scholar

[8]

M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas, Economics of conflict: An overview, in Handbook of Defense Economics (ed. T. Sandler and K. Hartley), Vol 2., Elsevier (2007). doi: 10.2139/ssrn.895307.  Google Scholar

[9]

H. Grossman, The Creation of effective property rights, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 347-352. doi: 10.1257/aer.91.2.347.  Google Scholar

[10]

S. Hart and M. Kurz, Endogenous formation of coalitions, Econometrica, 51 (1983), 1047-1064. doi: 10.2307/1912051.  Google Scholar

[11]

T. Miceli and D. Lueck, Property Law, in Handbook of Law and Economics (ed. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell), Elsevier, 2007. Google Scholar

[12]

R. Posner, Economic analysis of the law, Stanford Law Review, 26 (1974), p711. doi: 10.2307/1227682.  Google Scholar

[13]

D. Ray and R. Vohra, A theory of endogenous coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 26 (1999), 286-336. doi: 10.1006/game.1998.0648.  Google Scholar

[14]

D. Ray and R. Vohra, Farsighted stable set, Econometrica, 83 (2015), 977-1011. doi: 10.3982/ECTA12022.  Google Scholar

[15]

S. Sanchez-Pages, On the social efficiency of conflict, Economics Letters, 90 (2006), 96-101. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.011.  Google Scholar

[16]

S. Sanchez-Pages, Rivalry, exclusion and coalitions, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9 (2007), 809-830. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00333.x.  Google Scholar

[17]

S. Skaperdas, Cooperation and conflict in the absence of property rights, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 720-739. Google Scholar

[18]

S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions, Economic Theory, 7 (1996), 283-290. doi: 10.1007/BF01213906.  Google Scholar

[19]

J. Umbeck, Might makes rights: A theory of the foundation and initial distribution of property rights, Economic Inquiry, 19 (1981), 38-59. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00602.x.  Google Scholar

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