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Interception in differential pursuit/evasion games
Conflict, private and communal property
1. | Al Ajusco 20, México City, 10740 México, D.F., Mexico, Mexico |
References:
[1] |
A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, The property rights paradigm, Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), 16-27.
doi: 10.1017/S0022050700076403. |
[2] |
A. Bogomolnaia and M. Jackson, The stability of hedonic coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002), 201-230.
doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0877. |
[3] |
F. Bloch, Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff Division, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 90-123.
doi: 10.1006/game.1996.0043. |
[4] |
F. Bloch, Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (ed. M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas), Oxford University Press, 2011.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0020. |
[5] |
M. S. Y. Chwe, Farsighted coalition stability, Journal of Economic Theory, 63 (1994), 299-325.
doi: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1044. |
[6] |
D. de Meza and J. R. Gould, The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 561-580. |
[7] |
H. Demsetz, Towards a theory of property rights, Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, 3 (2000), 163-177.
doi: 10.1057/9780230523210_9. |
[8] |
M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas, Economics of conflict: An overview, in Handbook of Defense Economics (ed. T. Sandler and K. Hartley), Vol 2., Elsevier (2007).
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.895307. |
[9] |
H. Grossman, The Creation of effective property rights, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 347-352.
doi: 10.1257/aer.91.2.347. |
[10] |
S. Hart and M. Kurz, Endogenous formation of coalitions, Econometrica, 51 (1983), 1047-1064.
doi: 10.2307/1912051. |
[11] |
T. Miceli and D. Lueck, Property Law, in Handbook of Law and Economics (ed. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell), Elsevier, 2007. |
[12] |
R. Posner, Economic analysis of the law, Stanford Law Review, 26 (1974), p711.
doi: 10.2307/1227682. |
[13] |
D. Ray and R. Vohra, A theory of endogenous coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 26 (1999), 286-336.
doi: 10.1006/game.1998.0648. |
[14] |
D. Ray and R. Vohra, Farsighted stable set, Econometrica, 83 (2015), 977-1011.
doi: 10.3982/ECTA12022. |
[15] |
S. Sanchez-Pages, On the social efficiency of conflict, Economics Letters, 90 (2006), 96-101.
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.011. |
[16] |
S. Sanchez-Pages, Rivalry, exclusion and coalitions, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9 (2007), 809-830.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00333.x. |
[17] |
S. Skaperdas, Cooperation and conflict in the absence of property rights, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 720-739. |
[18] |
S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions, Economic Theory, 7 (1996), 283-290.
doi: 10.1007/BF01213906. |
[19] |
J. Umbeck, Might makes rights: A theory of the foundation and initial distribution of property rights, Economic Inquiry, 19 (1981), 38-59.
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00602.x. |
show all references
References:
[1] |
A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, The property rights paradigm, Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), 16-27.
doi: 10.1017/S0022050700076403. |
[2] |
A. Bogomolnaia and M. Jackson, The stability of hedonic coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002), 201-230.
doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0877. |
[3] |
F. Bloch, Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff Division, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 90-123.
doi: 10.1006/game.1996.0043. |
[4] |
F. Bloch, Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts, The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (ed. M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas), Oxford University Press, 2011.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0020. |
[5] |
M. S. Y. Chwe, Farsighted coalition stability, Journal of Economic Theory, 63 (1994), 299-325.
doi: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1044. |
[6] |
D. de Meza and J. R. Gould, The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 561-580. |
[7] |
H. Demsetz, Towards a theory of property rights, Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, 3 (2000), 163-177.
doi: 10.1057/9780230523210_9. |
[8] |
M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas, Economics of conflict: An overview, in Handbook of Defense Economics (ed. T. Sandler and K. Hartley), Vol 2., Elsevier (2007).
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.895307. |
[9] |
H. Grossman, The Creation of effective property rights, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 347-352.
doi: 10.1257/aer.91.2.347. |
[10] |
S. Hart and M. Kurz, Endogenous formation of coalitions, Econometrica, 51 (1983), 1047-1064.
doi: 10.2307/1912051. |
[11] |
T. Miceli and D. Lueck, Property Law, in Handbook of Law and Economics (ed. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell), Elsevier, 2007. |
[12] |
R. Posner, Economic analysis of the law, Stanford Law Review, 26 (1974), p711.
doi: 10.2307/1227682. |
[13] |
D. Ray and R. Vohra, A theory of endogenous coalition structures, Games and Economic Behavior, 26 (1999), 286-336.
doi: 10.1006/game.1998.0648. |
[14] |
D. Ray and R. Vohra, Farsighted stable set, Econometrica, 83 (2015), 977-1011.
doi: 10.3982/ECTA12022. |
[15] |
S. Sanchez-Pages, On the social efficiency of conflict, Economics Letters, 90 (2006), 96-101.
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.011. |
[16] |
S. Sanchez-Pages, Rivalry, exclusion and coalitions, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9 (2007), 809-830.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00333.x. |
[17] |
S. Skaperdas, Cooperation and conflict in the absence of property rights, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 720-739. |
[18] |
S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions, Economic Theory, 7 (1996), 283-290.
doi: 10.1007/BF01213906. |
[19] |
J. Umbeck, Might makes rights: A theory of the foundation and initial distribution of property rights, Economic Inquiry, 19 (1981), 38-59.
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00602.x. |
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