October  2018, 5(4): 343-355. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018021

Technology transfer: Barriers and opportunities

Universidad Carlos Ⅲ, calle Madrid 126, Getafe, Madrid, Spain

* Corresponding author: Luis C. Corchón

Received  September 2018 Revised  October 2018 Published  November 2018

In this paper we study technology transfer in a duopoly model with heterogeneous goods under quantity and price competition. We obtain three conclusions: Firstly, under product heterogeneity, technology transfer can take any form. Secondly, the properties found in the homogeneous case generalize to the heterogeneous case with various degrees of generality. Finally, if demand is not symmetric we may find full technology transfer between firms with different sizes and that firms with similar technology do not engage in technology transfer. We find evidence of the latter in the market for antidepressants.

Citation: Luis C. Corchón, Clara Eugenia García. Technology transfer: Barriers and opportunities. Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2018, 5 (4) : 343-355. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018021
References:
[1]

E. R. A. BerndtD. N. MisholA. Arcelus and T. Lasky, An analysis of the diffusion of new antidepressants: Variety, quality, and marketing efforts, Journal of Mental Health Policy Economics, 5 (2002), 3-19. 

[2]

L. C. Corchón, Comparative statics for aggregative games: The strong concavity case, Mathematical Social Sciences, 28 (1994), 151-165.  doi: 10.1016/0165-4896(94)90001-9.

[3]

J. Friedman, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, North Holland, 1977.

[4]

D. Gale and H. Nikaido, The jacobian matrix and the global univalence of mappings, Mathematische Annalen, 159 (1965), 81-93.  doi: 10.1007/BF01360282.

[5]

M. Katz and C. Shapiro, On the licencing of innovations, Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (1985), 504-520. 

[6]

S. Marjit, On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer, Economics Letters, 33 (1990), 293-298.  doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(90)90018-V.

[7]

A. Mukherjee, Technology transfer with commitment, Economic Theory, 17 (2001), 345-369.  doi: 10.1007/PL00004109.

[8]

A. Mukherjee and N. Balasubramanian, Technology Transfer in a Differentiated Product Market, W. P., Technisque Universiteit Eindhoven, 1999.

[9]

S. Salop, Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1979), 141-156. 

show all references

References:
[1]

E. R. A. BerndtD. N. MisholA. Arcelus and T. Lasky, An analysis of the diffusion of new antidepressants: Variety, quality, and marketing efforts, Journal of Mental Health Policy Economics, 5 (2002), 3-19. 

[2]

L. C. Corchón, Comparative statics for aggregative games: The strong concavity case, Mathematical Social Sciences, 28 (1994), 151-165.  doi: 10.1016/0165-4896(94)90001-9.

[3]

J. Friedman, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, North Holland, 1977.

[4]

D. Gale and H. Nikaido, The jacobian matrix and the global univalence of mappings, Mathematische Annalen, 159 (1965), 81-93.  doi: 10.1007/BF01360282.

[5]

M. Katz and C. Shapiro, On the licencing of innovations, Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (1985), 504-520. 

[6]

S. Marjit, On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer, Economics Letters, 33 (1990), 293-298.  doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(90)90018-V.

[7]

A. Mukherjee, Technology transfer with commitment, Economic Theory, 17 (2001), 345-369.  doi: 10.1007/PL00004109.

[8]

A. Mukherjee and N. Balasubramanian, Technology Transfer in a Differentiated Product Market, W. P., Technisque Universiteit Eindhoven, 1999.

[9]

S. Salop, Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1979), 141-156. 

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