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Social networks and global transactions

  • * Corresponding author: Yuki Kumagai

    * Corresponding author: Yuki Kumagai
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  • In the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring, Bhaskar and Obara [2] construct a belief-based mixed trigger strategy which may be modified to approximate full cooperation when a public randomisation device is available. By modifying their assumption about trading relationships, this paper generalises the model and demonstrates that without introducing public randomisations, long-run cooperation may be approximately sustained by mixed trigger strategies with delayed communication. By applying our model, we investigate when efficient trade is attainable in a nonmarket trading system of social networks by looking into a role of communication in long-run community enforcement of efficient trade.

    Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A25, 91B60; Secondary: 91B44.


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  • Table 1.  The stage-game payoffs

    $ e $ $ s $
    $ e $ $ 1, 1 $ $ -l, 1+g $
    $ s $ $ 1+g, - l $ $ 0 $, $ 0 $
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  • [1] D. AbreuP. Milgrom and D. Pearce, Information and timing in repeated partnerships, Econometrica, 59 (1991), 1713-1733.  doi: 10.2307/2938286.
    [2] V. Bhaskar and I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, 102 (2002), 40-69.  doi: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2878.
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    [5] A. GreifInstitutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval trade, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2006.  doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511791307.
    [6] M. Kandori, Social norms and community enforcement, Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992), 63-80. 
    [7] M. Kandori, Repeated games played by overlapping generations of players, Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992), 81-92.  doi: 10.2307/2297926.
    [8] R. RadnerR. Myerson and E. Maskin, An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria, Review of Economic Studies, 53 (1986), 59-69.  doi: 10.2307/2297591.
    [9] J. Rauch and V. Trindade, Ethnic Chinese networks in international trade, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84 (2002), 116-130. 
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