Social networks and global transactions

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doi:10.3934/jdg.2019015

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2019, Volume 6, Issue 3: 211-219. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2019015

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Social networks and global transactions

School of Management, Yasuda Women's University, 6-13-1 Yasuhigashi, Hiroshima, 731-0153, Japan

^* Corresponding author: Yuki Kumagai
^* Corresponding author: Yuki Kumagai

Received: February 28, 2019

Published: August 2019

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Abstract

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring, Bhaskar and Obara [2] construct a belief-based mixed trigger strategy which may be modified to approximate full cooperation when a public randomisation device is available. By modifying their assumption about trading relationships, this paper generalises the model and demonstrates that without introducing public randomisations, long-run cooperation may be approximately sustained by mixed trigger strategies with delayed communication. By applying our model, we investigate when efficient trade is attainable in a nonmarket trading system of social networks by looking into a role of communication in long-run community enforcement of efficient trade.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A25, 91B60; Secondary: 91B44.

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Table 1. The stage-game payoffs

$ e $ $ s $

$ e $ $ 1, 1 $ $ -l, 1+g $

$ s $ $ 1+g, - l $ $ 0 $, $ 0 $

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References

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