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On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in strategic-form games

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  • We consider a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in strategic-form games: for any two distinct strategy profiles, there is a player who can obtain a higher payoff by unilaterally changing the strategy from one strategy profile to the other strategy profile. An example of a game that satisfies this condition is the prisoner's dilemma. Viewed as a solution concept, the Nash equilibrium satisfying the condition is stronger than strict Nash Equilibrium and weaker than strict dominant strategy equilibrium.

    Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A10.


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