Article Contents
Article Contents

# Topological essentiality in infinite games

• By constructing a corresponding Nash map, we prove that every infinite game with compact metrizable sets of strategies and continuous payoffs has such a topological essential component that contains a minimal payoff-wise essential set containing a stable set, and deduce that every topological essential equilibrium is payoff-wise essential and so is perfect.
Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A10, 60B10; Secondary: 46G12.

 Citation:

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