A Stackelberg game management model of the urban public transport

Lianju Sun; Ziyou Gao; Yiju Wang

doi:10.3934/jimo.2012.8.507

Article Contents

2012, Volume 8, Issue 2: 507-520. Doi: 10.3934/jimo.2012.8.507

This issue Previous Article Polymorphic uncertain nonlinear programming model and algorithm for maximizing the fatigue life of V-belt drive Next Article

A Stackelberg game management model of the urban public transport

1.
School of Mathematical Sciences, Qufu Normal University, Qufu Shandong, 273165
2.
School of Traffic and Transportation, State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044
3.
School of Management Science, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao Shandong, 276800

Received: December 31, 2010

Revised: December 31, 2011

Published: March 2012

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Abstract

For the urban public transport management problem, based on analysis of the competition and cooperation relationship among operators on a common network, we establish a generalized Nash equilibrium game first; and then by analyzing the dynamic interaction between manager and operators, we propose a non-cooperative Stackelberg game model in which the manager is the leader and the operators are the followers. To solve the model, we transform it into a variational inequality problem, and the gap function method and the augmented Lagrange algorithm are applied. The given numerical experiments show the efficiency of the proposed model and algorithms.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 90B20, 91A80; Secondary: 91B50.

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