A penalty method for generalized Nash equilibrium problems

Yanhong Yuan; Hongwei Zhang; Liwei Zhang

doi:10.3934/jimo.2012.8.51

Article Contents

2012, Volume 8, Issue 1: 51-65. Doi: 10.3934/jimo.2012.8.51

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A penalty method for generalized Nash equilibrium problems

1.
School of Mathematical Sciences, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024

Received: November 30, 2010

Revised: June 30, 2011

Published: December 2011

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Abstract

This paper considers a penalty algorithm for solving the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Under the GNEP-MFCQ at a limiting point of the sequence generated by the algorithm, we demonstrate that the limit point is a solution to the GNEP and the parameter becomes a constant after a finite iterations. We formulate the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a penalized problem into a system of nonsmooth equations and demonstrate the nonsingularity of its Clarke’s generalized Jacobian at the KKT point under the so-called GNEP-Second Order Sufficient Condition. The nonsingularity facilitates the application of the smoothing Newton method for the global convergence and local quadratic rate. Finally, the numerical results are reported to show the effectiveness of the penalty method in solving generalized Nash equilibrium problem.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A06; Secondary: 91-08, 90C90.

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References

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