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October  2015, 11(4): 1165-1173. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2015.11.1165

Bounds on price of anarchy on linear cost functions

Fan Sha 1, , Deren Han 2, and  Weijun Zhong 1,

1. 

Department of Management Science and Engineering, School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, 210096, China, China
2. 

School of Mathematical Sciences, Jiangsu Key Labratory for NSLSCS, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, 210023

Received  September 2013 Revised  August 2014 Published  March 2015

The price of anarchy (POA) is a quite powerful tool to characterize the efficiency loss of competition on networks. In this paper, we derive a bound for POA for the case that the cost function is linear but asymmetric. The result is a generalization of that of Han et. al. in the sense that the involved matrix is only assumed to be positive semidefinite, but not positive definite. Consequently, the range of application of the result is widened. We give two simple examples to illustrate our result.
Keywords: price of anarchy, system optimum, cost function., Nash equilibrium, network.
Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A10, 90b20; Secondary: 65F10, 65k1.
Citation: Fan Sha, Deren Han, Weijun Zhong. Bounds on price of anarchy on linear cost functions. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 2015, 11 (4) : 1165-1173. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2015.11.1165
References:
[1]

P. Dubey, Inefficiency of Nash equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research, 11 (1986), 1-8. doi: 10.1287/moor.11.1.1.  Google Scholar

[2]

J. H. Hammond, Solving Asymmetric Variational Inequality problems and Systems of Equations with Generalized Nonlinear Programming Algorithms, PhD Thesis, MIT, 1985.  Google Scholar

[3]

D. Han, J. Sun and M. Ang, New bounds for the price of anarchy under nonlinear and asymmetric costs, Optimization, 63 (2014), 271-284. doi: 10.1080/02331934.2011.641017.  Google Scholar

[4]

R. Jahari and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Network resource allocation and a congestion game, Proceedings of the Annual Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing, 41 (2003), 769-778. Google Scholar

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E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, Computer Science Review, 32 (2009), 65-69. doi: 10.1016/j.cosrev.2009.04.003.  Google Scholar

[6]

G. Perakis, The "price of anarchy" under nonlinear and asymmetric costs, Mathematics of Operations Research, 32 (2007), 614-628. doi: 10.1287/moor.1070.0258.  Google Scholar

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T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing, Journal of the ACM, 49 (2002), 236-259. doi: 10.1145/506147.506153.  Google Scholar

[8]

R. Soeiro, A. Mousa and T. R. Oliveira and A. A. Pinto, Dynamics of human decisions, Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 1 (2014), 121-151. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.121.  Google Scholar

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J. Sun, A convergence analysis for a convex version of Dikin's algorithm, Annals of Operations Research, 62 (1996), 357-374. doi: 10.1007/BF02206823.  Google Scholar

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Y. Viossat, Game dynamics and Nash equilibria, Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 1 (2014), 537-553. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537.  Google Scholar

show all references

References:
[1]

P. Dubey, Inefficiency of Nash equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research, 11 (1986), 1-8. doi: 10.1287/moor.11.1.1.  Google Scholar

[2]

J. H. Hammond, Solving Asymmetric Variational Inequality problems and Systems of Equations with Generalized Nonlinear Programming Algorithms, PhD Thesis, MIT, 1985.  Google Scholar

[3]

D. Han, J. Sun and M. Ang, New bounds for the price of anarchy under nonlinear and asymmetric costs, Optimization, 63 (2014), 271-284. doi: 10.1080/02331934.2011.641017.  Google Scholar

[4]

R. Jahari and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Network resource allocation and a congestion game, Proceedings of the Annual Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing, 41 (2003), 769-778. Google Scholar

[5]

E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, Computer Science Review, 32 (2009), 65-69. doi: 10.1016/j.cosrev.2009.04.003.  Google Scholar

[6]

G. Perakis, The "price of anarchy" under nonlinear and asymmetric costs, Mathematics of Operations Research, 32 (2007), 614-628. doi: 10.1287/moor.1070.0258.  Google Scholar

[7]

T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing, Journal of the ACM, 49 (2002), 236-259. doi: 10.1145/506147.506153.  Google Scholar

[8]

R. Soeiro, A. Mousa and T. R. Oliveira and A. A. Pinto, Dynamics of human decisions, Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 1 (2014), 121-151. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.121.  Google Scholar

[9]

J. Sun, A convergence analysis for a convex version of Dikin's algorithm, Annals of Operations Research, 62 (1996), 357-374. doi: 10.1007/BF02206823.  Google Scholar

[10]

Y. Viossat, Game dynamics and Nash equilibria, Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 1 (2014), 537-553. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537.  Google Scholar

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