Electricity day-ahead markets: Computation of Nash equilibria

Margarida Carvalho; João Pedro Pedroso; João Saraiva

doi:10.3934/jimo.2015.11.985

Article Contents

2015, Volume 11, Issue 3: 985-998. Doi: 10.3934/jimo.2015.11.985

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Electricity day-ahead markets: Computation of Nash equilibria

1.
Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade do Porto and INESC TEC, Rua do Campo Alegre, 4169-007 Porto
2.
Faculdade de Engenharia, Universidade do Porto and INESC TEC, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200 - 465 Porto

Received: May 2012

Revised: June 2014

Published: July 2015

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Abstract

In a restructured electricity sector, day-ahead markets can be modeled as a game where some players - the producers - submit their proposals. To analyze the companies' behavior we have used the concept of Nash equilibrium as a solution in these multi-agent interaction problems. In this paper, we present new and crucial adaptations of two well-known mechanisms, the adjustment process and the relaxation algorithm, in order to achieve the goal of computing Nash equilibria. The advantages of these approaches are highlighted and compared with those available in the literature.

Keywords:

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A80; Secondary: 90C27, 65K05, 90C59.

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