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January  2019, 15(1): 131-157. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2018036

Mechanism design in project procurement auctions with cost uncertainty and failure risk

Xiaohu Qian 1,2, , Min Huang 3,, , Wai-Ki Ching 4, , Loo Hay Lee 5, and  Xingwei Wang 6,

1. 

College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China
2. 

Research Institute of Business Analytics & Supply Chain Management, College of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China
3. 

College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation, for Process Industries (Northeastern University), Shenyang, Liaoning 110819, China
4. 

Department of Mathematics, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China
5. 

Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260, Singapore
6. 

College of Software, Northeastern University, Shenyang, Liaoning 110819, China

* Corresponding author: M. Huang

Received  April 2017 Revised  September 2017 Published  April 2018

Fund Project: This work has been sponsored by Distinguished Young Scholars Award of NSFC Grant #71325002; Major International Joint Research Project of NSFC Grant #71620107003; Foundation for Innovative Research Groups of NSFC Grant #61621004; the 111 Project Grant #B16009; Fundamental Research Funds for State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries Grant #2013ZCX11; Research Funds of Shenzhen University Grant #2018059.

Project procurement has two important attributes: cost uncertainty and failure risk. Due to the incomplete feature of such attributes, a novel mechanism incorporating contingent payments and cost sharing contracts is proposed for the buyer. Constructing models of bid decisions for risk averse and risk neutral suppliers, respectively, closed-form solutions of optimal bid prices are derived. By investigating the properties of bid prices in a first-score sealed-bid reverse auction, we find that when the degree of risk aversion or the variance of unpredictable cost is sufficiently small, bid prices of risk averse suppliers could be lower than those of risk neutral suppliers. Yet risk averse suppliers always bid higher than risk neutral suppliers in a second-score sealed-bid reverse auction. An interesting result verified by numerical experiments is that the classical revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds for the proposed mechanism if suppliers involve risk averse behavior. In this case, the buyer's best choice is to adopt a first-score sealed-bid reverse auction. We also provide decision support for the buyer to achieve optimal expected profit.

Keywords: Reverse auction, bid decision, mechanism design, risk aversion and project procurement.
Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 58F15, 58F17; Secondary: 53C35.
Citation: Xiaohu Qian, Min Huang, Wai-Ki Ching, Loo Hay Lee, Xingwei Wang. Mechanism design in project procurement auctions with cost uncertainty and failure risk. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 2019, 15 (1) : 131-157. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2018036
References:
[1]

J. Asker and E. Cantillon, Procurement when price and quality matter, Rand J Econ, 41 (2010), 1-34.   Google Scholar

[2]

P. Bajari, S. Houghton and S. Tadelis, Bidding for incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of adaptation costs, Am Econ Rev, 104 (2014), 1288-1319.   Google Scholar

[3]

S. Benjaafar, E. Elahi and K. L. Donohue, Outsourcing via service competition, Manage Sci, 53 (2007), 241-259.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0612.  Google Scholar

[4]

G. P. Cachon and P. Zhang, Procuring fast delivery: Sole sourcing with information asymmetry, Manage Sci, 52 (2006), 881-896.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0510.  Google Scholar

[5]

W. S. Chang, B. Chen and T. C. Salmon, An investigation of the average bid mechanism for procurement auctions, Manage Sci, 61 (2015), 1237-1254.   Google Scholar

[6]

S. C. Chang, M. M. Hsieh and C. W. Chen, Reverse auction-based job assignment among foundry fabs, Int J Prod Res, 45 (2007), 653-673.   Google Scholar

[7]

A. Chaturvedi and V. Martínez-de-Albéniz, Optimal procurement design in the presence of supply risk, M&SOM-Manuf Serv Oper Manag, 13 (2011), 227-243.  doi: 10.1287/msom.1100.0319.  Google Scholar

[8]

Y. K. Che, Design competition through multidimensional auctions, Rand J Econ, 24 (1993), 668-680.   Google Scholar

[9]

F. Chen, Auctioning supply contracts, Manage Sci, 53 (2007), 1562-1576.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0716.  Google Scholar

[10]

J. Chen, L. Xu and A. Whinston, Managing project failure risk through contingent contracts in procurement auctions, Decis Anal, 7 (2009), 23-39.  doi: 10.1287/deca.1090.0155.  Google Scholar

[11]

R. R. Chen, R. O. Roundy, R. Q. Zhang and G. Janakiraman, Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement, Manage Sci, 51 (2005), 467-482.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0329.  Google Scholar

[12]

C. B. Cheng, Solving a sealed-bid reverse auction problem by multiple-criterion decision-making methods, Comput Math Appl, 56 (2008), 3261-3274.  doi: 10.1016/j.camwa.2008.09.011.  Google Scholar

[13]

S. Dasgupta and D. F. Spulber, Managing procurement auctions, Inf Econ Policy, 4 (1990), 5-29.  doi: 10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9.  Google Scholar

[14]

R. Deb and D. Mishra, Implementation with contingent contracts, Econometrica, 82 (2014), 2371-2393.  doi: 10.3982/ECTA11561.  Google Scholar

[15]

I. Duenyas, B. Hu and D. R. Beil, Simple auctions for supply contracts, Manage Sci, 59 (2013), 2332-2342.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1705.  Google Scholar

[16]

R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and E. Katok, E-sourcing in procurement: Theory and behavior in reverse auctions with noncompetitive contracts, Manage Sci, 52 (2006), 581-596.   Google Scholar

[17]

C. Feldman, B. Wermund and C. Hlavaty, Fire official speculates on cause of Montrose blaze, Houston Chronicle, 2014, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Fire-official-speculates-on-cause-of-Montrose-5347617.php. Google Scholar

[18]

R. G. Hansen, Auctions with endogenous quantity, Rand J Econ, 19 (1988), 44-58.  doi: 10.2307/2555396.  Google Scholar

[19]

M. Huang, X. Qian, S. C. Fang and X. Wang, Winner determination for risk aversion buyers in multi-attribute reverse auction, Omega-Int J Manage Sci, 59 (2016), 184-200.  doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2015.06.007.  Google Scholar

[20]

X. Huang, S. Choi, W. Ching, T. Siu and M. Huang, On supply chain coordination for false failure returns: A quantity discount contract approach, Int J Prod Econ, 133 (2011), 634-644.  doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.04.031.  Google Scholar

[21] V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, Burlington, Massachusetts, 2009.   Google Scholar
[22]

J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Auctioning incentive contracts, J Polit Econ, 95 (1987), 921-937.  doi: 10.1086/261496.  Google Scholar

[23]

T. Li, J. Lu and L. Zhao, Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: Theory and evidence, Rand J Econ, 46 (2015), 524-545.  doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12096.  Google Scholar

[24]

S. Liu, Q. Hu and Y. Xu, Optimal inventory control with fixed ordering cost for selling by Internet auctions, J Ind Manag Optim, 8 (2012), 19-40.   Google Scholar

[25]

C. Ma, Y. C. E. Lee, C. K. Chan and Y. Wei, Auction and contracting mechanisms for channel coordination with consideration of participants' risk attitudes, J Ind Manag Optim, 13 (2017), 775-801.   Google Scholar

[26]

E. Maskin and J. Riley, Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers, Econometrica, 52 (1984), 1473-1518.  doi: 10.2307/1913516.  Google Scholar

[27]

R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan, Bidding for contracts: A principal-agent analysis, Rand J Econ, 17 (1986), 326-338.  doi: 10.2307/2555714.  Google Scholar

[28]

X. Qian, S.-C. Fang, M. Huang, Q. An and X. Wang, Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders, Ann Oper Res, (2017), 1-21.  doi: 10.1007/s10479-017-2475-6.  Google Scholar

[29]

T. I. Tunca, D. J. Wu and F. Zhong, An empirical analysis of price, quality, and incumbency in procurement auctions, M&SOM-Manuf Serv Oper Manag, 16 (2014), 346-364.  doi: 10.1287/msom.2014.0485.  Google Scholar

[30]

F. Wex, G. Schryen, S. Feuerriegel and D. Neumann, Emergency response in natural disaster management: Allocation and scheduling of rescue units, Eur J Oper Res, 235 (2014), 697-708.  doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.10.029.  Google Scholar

[31]

Z. B. Yang, G. Aydin, V. Babich and D. R. Beil, Supply disruptions, asymmetric information, and a backup production option, Manage Sci, 55 (2009), 192-209.   Google Scholar

[32]

Z. B. Yang, G. Aydin, V. Babich and D. R. Beil, Using a dual-sourcing option in the presence of asymmetric information about supplier reliability: Competition vs. diversification, Manage Sci, 14 (2012), 202-217.   Google Scholar

show all references

References:
[1]

J. Asker and E. Cantillon, Procurement when price and quality matter, Rand J Econ, 41 (2010), 1-34.   Google Scholar

[2]

P. Bajari, S. Houghton and S. Tadelis, Bidding for incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of adaptation costs, Am Econ Rev, 104 (2014), 1288-1319.   Google Scholar

[3]

S. Benjaafar, E. Elahi and K. L. Donohue, Outsourcing via service competition, Manage Sci, 53 (2007), 241-259.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0612.  Google Scholar

[4]

G. P. Cachon and P. Zhang, Procuring fast delivery: Sole sourcing with information asymmetry, Manage Sci, 52 (2006), 881-896.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0510.  Google Scholar

[5]

W. S. Chang, B. Chen and T. C. Salmon, An investigation of the average bid mechanism for procurement auctions, Manage Sci, 61 (2015), 1237-1254.   Google Scholar

[6]

S. C. Chang, M. M. Hsieh and C. W. Chen, Reverse auction-based job assignment among foundry fabs, Int J Prod Res, 45 (2007), 653-673.   Google Scholar

[7]

A. Chaturvedi and V. Martínez-de-Albéniz, Optimal procurement design in the presence of supply risk, M&SOM-Manuf Serv Oper Manag, 13 (2011), 227-243.  doi: 10.1287/msom.1100.0319.  Google Scholar

[8]

Y. K. Che, Design competition through multidimensional auctions, Rand J Econ, 24 (1993), 668-680.   Google Scholar

[9]

F. Chen, Auctioning supply contracts, Manage Sci, 53 (2007), 1562-1576.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0716.  Google Scholar

[10]

J. Chen, L. Xu and A. Whinston, Managing project failure risk through contingent contracts in procurement auctions, Decis Anal, 7 (2009), 23-39.  doi: 10.1287/deca.1090.0155.  Google Scholar

[11]

R. R. Chen, R. O. Roundy, R. Q. Zhang and G. Janakiraman, Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement, Manage Sci, 51 (2005), 467-482.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0329.  Google Scholar

[12]

C. B. Cheng, Solving a sealed-bid reverse auction problem by multiple-criterion decision-making methods, Comput Math Appl, 56 (2008), 3261-3274.  doi: 10.1016/j.camwa.2008.09.011.  Google Scholar

[13]

S. Dasgupta and D. F. Spulber, Managing procurement auctions, Inf Econ Policy, 4 (1990), 5-29.  doi: 10.1016/0167-6245(89)90030-9.  Google Scholar

[14]

R. Deb and D. Mishra, Implementation with contingent contracts, Econometrica, 82 (2014), 2371-2393.  doi: 10.3982/ECTA11561.  Google Scholar

[15]

I. Duenyas, B. Hu and D. R. Beil, Simple auctions for supply contracts, Manage Sci, 59 (2013), 2332-2342.  doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1705.  Google Scholar

[16]

R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and E. Katok, E-sourcing in procurement: Theory and behavior in reverse auctions with noncompetitive contracts, Manage Sci, 52 (2006), 581-596.   Google Scholar

[17]

C. Feldman, B. Wermund and C. Hlavaty, Fire official speculates on cause of Montrose blaze, Houston Chronicle, 2014, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Fire-official-speculates-on-cause-of-Montrose-5347617.php. Google Scholar

[18]

R. G. Hansen, Auctions with endogenous quantity, Rand J Econ, 19 (1988), 44-58.  doi: 10.2307/2555396.  Google Scholar

[19]

M. Huang, X. Qian, S. C. Fang and X. Wang, Winner determination for risk aversion buyers in multi-attribute reverse auction, Omega-Int J Manage Sci, 59 (2016), 184-200.  doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2015.06.007.  Google Scholar

[20]

X. Huang, S. Choi, W. Ching, T. Siu and M. Huang, On supply chain coordination for false failure returns: A quantity discount contract approach, Int J Prod Econ, 133 (2011), 634-644.  doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.04.031.  Google Scholar

[21] V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, Burlington, Massachusetts, 2009.   Google Scholar
[22]

J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, Auctioning incentive contracts, J Polit Econ, 95 (1987), 921-937.  doi: 10.1086/261496.  Google Scholar

[23]

T. Li, J. Lu and L. Zhao, Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: Theory and evidence, Rand J Econ, 46 (2015), 524-545.  doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12096.  Google Scholar

[24]

S. Liu, Q. Hu and Y. Xu, Optimal inventory control with fixed ordering cost for selling by Internet auctions, J Ind Manag Optim, 8 (2012), 19-40.   Google Scholar

[25]

C. Ma, Y. C. E. Lee, C. K. Chan and Y. Wei, Auction and contracting mechanisms for channel coordination with consideration of participants' risk attitudes, J Ind Manag Optim, 13 (2017), 775-801.   Google Scholar

[26]

E. Maskin and J. Riley, Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers, Econometrica, 52 (1984), 1473-1518.  doi: 10.2307/1913516.  Google Scholar

[27]

R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan, Bidding for contracts: A principal-agent analysis, Rand J Econ, 17 (1986), 326-338.  doi: 10.2307/2555714.  Google Scholar

[28]

X. Qian, S.-C. Fang, M. Huang, Q. An and X. Wang, Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders, Ann Oper Res, (2017), 1-21.  doi: 10.1007/s10479-017-2475-6.  Google Scholar

[29]

T. I. Tunca, D. J. Wu and F. Zhong, An empirical analysis of price, quality, and incumbency in procurement auctions, M&SOM-Manuf Serv Oper Manag, 16 (2014), 346-364.  doi: 10.1287/msom.2014.0485.  Google Scholar

[30]

F. Wex, G. Schryen, S. Feuerriegel and D. Neumann, Emergency response in natural disaster management: Allocation and scheduling of rescue units, Eur J Oper Res, 235 (2014), 697-708.  doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.10.029.  Google Scholar

[31]

Z. B. Yang, G. Aydin, V. Babich and D. R. Beil, Supply disruptions, asymmetric information, and a backup production option, Manage Sci, 55 (2009), 192-209.   Google Scholar

[32]

Z. B. Yang, G. Aydin, V. Babich and D. R. Beil, Using a dual-sourcing option in the presence of asymmetric information about supplier reliability: Competition vs. diversification, Manage Sci, 14 (2012), 202-217.   Google Scholar

Figure 1.  Timing of events
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Figure 2.  Comparison of ex ante expected payments of the buyer when facing risk averse suppliers in FSRA and SSRA
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Figure 3.  Comparison of ex ante expected payments of the buyer when facing risk averse and risk neutral suppliers in FSRA
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Figure 4.  Impact of parameters on β and ∆ for the buyer when facing risk averse suppliers in FSRA
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