Optimal financing and operational decisions of capital-constrained manufacturer under green credit and subsidy

Shuai Huang; Zhi-Ping Fan; Xiaohuan Wang

doi:10.3934/jimo.2019110

Article Contents

2021, Volume 17, Issue 1: 261-277. Doi: 10.3934/jimo.2019110

This issue Previous Article Multi-stage distributionally robust optimization with risk aversion Next Article Mean-field analysis of a scaling MAC radio protocol

Optimal financing and operational decisions of capital-constrained manufacturer under green credit and subsidy

1.
Department of Information Management and Decision Sciences, School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China
2.
State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China

^* Corresponding author: ZHI-PING FAN
^* Corresponding author: ZHI-PING FAN

Received: October 31, 2018

Revised: February 28, 2019

Early access: September 2019

Published: January 2021

The study is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No. 71871049, 71772034) and the 111 Project (B16009)

Abstract Full Text(HTML) Figure(5) / Table(1) Related Papers Cited by

Abstract

To stimulate the capital-constrained manufacturer to produce green products, the government often adopts two incentive mechanisms: green credit (i.e., subsidy offered directly to bank) and subsidy (i.e., subsidy offered directly to manufacturer). This paper examines the optimal interest rate of the bank, and the optimal product green degree and sales price of the manufacturer under the two mechanisms, respectively. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of these mechanisms on the optimal decisions, the profits of players, the social welfare and the environmental benefits. Several important results are obtained. First, when the total government subsidy is low, the green credit mechanism can bring the higher green degree, product sales price and demand, as well as higher profits for the bank and manufacturer, rather than the subsidy mechanism. Otherwise, the result is opposite. Second, the government should adopt the green credit mechanism to support the manufacturer to develop green products when the budget is limited and relatively low. If the government budget is sufficient, the subsidy mechanism is the best choice, which can bring higher economic and environmental benefits.

Keywords:

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 90B05, 68W27; Secondary: 68W40.

Citation:

Full Text(HTML)

Figure 1. The green credit mechanism

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 2. The subsidy mechanism

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 3. The interest rate, product's green degree, sales price and market demand

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 4. The profits of the bank and the manufacturer

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 5. The social welfare and the environmental benefits

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Table 1. The profits of the bank and manufacturer under three scenarios

	$ {\Pi ^B} $	$ {\Pi ^M} $
Non-subsidy	$ \Pi _0^{B*} = \frac{{{a^2}{\theta ^2}}}{{16\left( {2k - {\theta ^2}} \right)}} $	$ \Pi _0^{M*} = \frac{{{a^2}\left( {4k - {\theta ^2}} \right)}}{{8\left( {2k - {\theta ^2}} \right)}} $
Green credit	$ \Pi _1^{B*} = \frac{{{a^2}{\theta ^2}}}{{16\left( {2k - {\theta ^2} - 2k{\tau _1}} \right)}} $	$ \Pi _1^{M*} = \frac{{{a^2}\left( {4k - {\theta ^2} - 4k{\tau _1}} \right)}}{{8\left( {2k - {\theta ^2} - 2k{\tau _1}} \right)}} $
Subsidy	$ \Pi _2^{B*} = \frac{{{a^2}{\theta ^2}{{\left( {1 + {\tau _2}} \right)}^2}}}{{16\left[ {2k - {\theta ^2}\left( {1 + {\tau _2}} \right)} \right]}} $	$ \Pi _2^{M*} = \frac{{{a^2}\left[ {4k - {\theta ^2}\left( {1 + {\tau _2}} \right)} \right]\left( {1 + {\tau _2}} \right)}}{{8\left[ {2k - {\theta ^2}\left( {1 + {\tau _2}} \right)} \right]}} $

| Show Table

DownLoad: CSV

Related Papers

Cited by

References

[1]	M. Aizawa and C. F. Yang, Green credit, green stimulus, green revolution? China's mobilization of banks for environmental cleanup, J. Environ. Dev., 19 (2010), 119-144. doi: 10.1177/1070496510371192.
[2]	B. Avci, K. Girotra and S. Netessine, Electric vehicles with a battery switching station: Adoption and environmental impact, Manage. Sci., 61 (2014), 772-794.
[3]	G. B. Bi, M. Y. Jin, L. Y. Ling and F. Yang, Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers, Ann. Oper. Res., 255 (2017), 547-568. doi: 10.1007/s10479-016-2106-7.
[4]	M. Burkart and T. Ellingsen, In-kind finance: A theory of trade credit, Am. Econ. Rev., 94 (2004), 569-590. doi: 10.1257/0002828041464579.
[5]	J. A. Buzacott and R. Q. Zhang, Inventory management with asset-based financing, Manage. Sci., 50 (2004), 1274-1292. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0278.
[6]	G. P. Cachon, Retail store density and the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, Manage. Sci., 60 (2014), 1907-1925.
[7]	E. Cao, L. X. Du and J. H. Ruan, Financing preferences and performance for an emission-dependent supply chain: Supplier vs. bank, Int. J. Prod. Econ., 208 (2019), 383-399. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.08.001.
[8]	Y.-K. Che and I. Gale, The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer, J. Econ. Theory, 92 (2000), 198-233. doi: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2639.
[9]	M. C. Cohen, R. Lobel and G. Perakis, The impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidy for green technology adoption, Manage. Sci., 62 (2016), 1235-1258.
[10]	S. Du, F. Ma, Z. Fu, L. Zhu and J. Zhang, Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system, Ann. Oper. Res., 228 (2015), 135-149. doi: 10.1007/s10479-011-0964-6.
[11]	J. Z. Gao, Z. D. Xiao, B. B. Cao and Q. F. Chai, Green supply chain planning considering consumer's transportation process, Transp. Res. Pt. e-Logist. Transp. Rev., 109 (2018), 311-330. doi: 10.1016/j.tre.2017.12.001.
[12]	A. Hafezalkotob, Direct and indirect intervention schemas of government in the competition between green and non-green supply chains, J. Clean Prod., 170 (2018), 753-772. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.09.124.
[13]	J. Hall, Environmental supply chain dynamics, J. Clean Prod., 8 (2000), 455-471. doi: 10.1016/S0959-6526(00)00013-5.
[14]	S. Huang, Z.-P. Fan and X. H. Wang, The impact of transportation fee on the performance of capital-constrained supply chain under 3PL financing service, Comput. Ind. Eng., 130 (2019), 358-369. doi: 10.1016/j.cie.2019.02.048.
[15]	B. Jing, X. F. Chen and G. S. Cai, Equilibrium financing in a distribution channel with capital constraint, Prod. Oper. Manag., 21 (2012), 1090-1101. doi: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01328.x.
[16]	P. R. Kleindorfer, K. Singhal and L. N. Van Wassenhove, Sustainable operations management, Prod. Oper. Manag., 14 (2005), 482-492. doi: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2005.tb00235.x.
[17]	P. Kouvelis and W. H. Zhao, The newsvendor problem and price-only contract when bankruptcy costs exist, Prod. Oper. Manag., 20 (2011), 921-936. doi: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01211.x.
[18]	P. Kouvelis and W. H. Zhao, Supply chain contract design under financial constraints and bankruptcy costs, Manage. Sci., 62 (2016), 2149-2455. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2248.
[19]	V. Krishnan and W. Zhu, Designing a family of development-intensive products, Manage. Sci., 52 (2006), 813-825. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0492.
[20]	J.-Y. Liu, Y. Xia, Y. Fan, S.-M. Lin and J. Wu, Assessment of a green credit policy aimed at energy-intensive industries in China based on a financial CGE model, J. Clean Prod., 163 (2017), 293-302. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.10.111.
[21]	R. Mahmoudi and M. Rasti-Barzoki, Sustainable supply chains under government intervention with a real-world case study: An evolutionary game theoretic approach, Comput. Ind. Eng., 116 (2018), 130-143. doi: 10.1016/j.cie.2017.12.028.
[22]	M. Parlar and Z. K. Weng, Balancing desirable but conflicting objectives in the newsvendor problem, IIE Trans., 35 (2003), 131-142. doi: 10.1080/07408170304380.
[23]	H. Peura, S. A. Yang and G. Lai, Trade credit in competition: A horizontal benefit, M & SOM-Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag., 19 (2017), 165-335. doi: 10.1287/msom.2016.0608.
[24]	G. Raz and A. Ovchinnikov, Coordinating pricing and supply of public interest goods using government rebates and subsidy, IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage., 62 (2015), 65-79. doi: 10.1109/TEM.2014.2380999.
[25]	H. H. Song and X. X. Gao, Green supply chain game model and analysis under revenue-sharing contract, J. Clean Prod., 170 (2018), 183-192. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.09.138.
[26]	C. S. Tang and S. Zhou, Research advances in environmentally and socially sustainable operations, Eur. J. Oper. Res., 223 (2012), 585-594. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.07.030.
[27]	Y.-C. Tsao, P.-L. Lee, C.-H. Chen and Z.-W. Liao, Sustainable newsvendor models under trade credit, J. Clean Prod., 141 (2017), 1478-1491. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.09.228.
[28]	S.-C. Tseng and S.-W. Hung, A strategic decision-making model considering the social costs of carbon dioxide emissions for sustainable supply chain management, J. Environ. Manage., 133 (2014), 315-322. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.11.023.
[29]	K. Wang, R. Q. Zhao and J. Peng, Trade credit contracting under asymmetric credit default risk: Screening, checking or insurance, Eur. J. Oper. Res., 266 (2018), 554-568. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.004.
[30]	D. D. Wu, L. Yang and D. L. Olson, Green supply chain management under capital constraint, Int. J. Prod. Econ., article in press. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.09.016.
[31]	N. Yan and B. Sun, Comparative analysis of supply chain financing decisions between different financing modes, J. Ind. Manag. Optim., 11 (2015), 1073-1087. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2015.11.1073.
[32]	D. Yang and T. Xiao, Pricing and green level decisions of a green supply chain with government interventions under fuzzy uncertainties, J. Clean Prod., 149 (2017), 1174-1187.
[33]	D.-X. Yang, Z.-Y. Chen, Y.-C. Yang and P.-Y. Nie, Green financial policies and capital flows, Physica A, 522 (2019), 135-146. doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.01.126.
[34]	H. Yang, W. Zhuo and L. Shao, Equilibrium evolution in a two-echelon supply chain with financially constrained retailers: The impact of equity financing, Int. J. Prod. Econ., 185 (2017), 139-149.
[35]	L. H. Zhang, J. G. Wang and J. X. You, Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products, Eur. J. Oper. Res., 241 (2015), 63-73. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.043.
[36]	W. G. Zhu and Y. J. He, Green product design in supply chains under competition, Eur. J. Oper. Res., 258 (2017), 165-180. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.08.053.