Article Contents
Article Contents

# Coordination of a sustainable reverse supply chain with revenue sharing contract

• * Corresponding author: Bibhas C. Giri
• In this article, a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain is considered under sustainability consideration through remanufacturing of waste materials. Depending upon quality, the collector collects the used products and forwards to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. The collector offers a reward or incentive to consumers to influence them to return the used items. The shortfall amount of collected used items, if any, is meet up by the supplier by supplying fresh raw materials. In three separate cases viz centralized, decentralized and revenue-sharing contract, optimal incentives for end-customers and optimal profits of supply chain members are determined. The revenue-sharing contract is implemented in two different settings - one including the supplier and the other one excluding the supplier. The win-win outcome for the supply chain members is investigated and a specific range of the sharing parameter for win-win outcome is obtained. Optimal results are supported by numerical analysis, and sensitivity of the optimal results with respect to key parameters is analyzed.

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 90B06; Secondary: 91A35.

 Citation:

• Figure 1.  Diagram of the supply chain model

Figure 2.  Proposed supply chain model under revenue sharing contract

Figure 3.  Concavity of $E(\Pi)$ w.r.to $p$ and $r$

Figure 4.  $L$ vs. profits of the SC and its entities

Figure 5.  $b$ vs. profits of the SC and its entities

Figure 6.  $r^{max}$ vs. profits of the SC and its entities

Table 1.  Optimal results

 Model $r^{*}$ $p^{*}$ $1-\phi$ $\phi_{1}+\phi_{2}$ $E(\Pi_{c})$ $E(\Pi_{m})$ $E(\Pi_{s})$ $E(\Pi)$ Centralized 26.67 437 - - - - - 143535 Decentralized 46.67 463 - - 6505 122018 10355 138878 RS-I 26.67 437 .01 - 7662 125518 10355 143535 RS-II 26.67 437 - 0.03 - 124536 - 143535

Figures(6)

Tables(1)