Article Contents
Article Contents

# On a continuous mixed strategies model for evolutionary game theory

• We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical properties of the model and global estimates. The asymptotic behavior and the stability of solutions in the case of two strategies is analyzed in details. Numerical schemes for two and three strategies which are able to capture the correct equilibrium states are also proposed together with several numerical examples.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 35Q91, 65R20, 45G10.

 Citation:

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