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Volume 9, 2022

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Volume 4, 2017

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Volume 1, 2014





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The Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG) is a pure and applied mathematical journal that publishes high quality peer-review and expository papers in all research areas of expertise of its editors. The main focus of JDG is in the interface of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory.

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  • Publishes 4 issues a year in January, April, July and October.
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  • JDG is a publication of the American Institute of Mathematical Sciences. All rights reserved.

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Decision Theory and large deviations for dynamical hypotheses tests: The Neyman-Pearson Lemma, Min-Max and Bayesian tests
Hermes H. Ferreira, Artur O. Lopes and Silvia R. C. Lopes
2022, 9(2) : 123-150 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021031 +[Abstract](572) +[HTML](187) +[PDF](475.68KB)
Properties of contests: Constructing contest success functions from best-responses
Luis Corchón and Marco Serena
2022, 9(2) : 151-163 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022001 +[Abstract](401) +[HTML](151) +[PDF](374.44KB)
Control problems with vanishing Lie Bracket arising from complete odd circulant evolutionary games
Christopher Griffin and James Fan
2022, 9(2) : 165-189 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022002 +[Abstract](297) +[HTML](156) +[PDF](901.44KB)
Stability of international pollution control games: A potential game approach
Jewaidu Rilwan, Poom Kumam and Onésimo Hernández-Lerma
2022, 9(2) : 191-202 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022003 +[Abstract](289) +[HTML](121) +[PDF](315.15KB)
Robust policy selection and harvest risk quantification for natural resources management under model uncertainty
Georgios I. Papayiannis
2022, 9(2) : 203-217 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022004 +[Abstract](268) +[HTML](132) +[PDF](383.68KB)
Exploring the gender gap in a closed market niche. Explicit solutions of an ODE model
David Sifuentes, Iván Téllez and Jorge Zazueta
2022, 9(2) : 219-228 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022005 +[Abstract](327) +[HTML](179) +[PDF](329.25KB)
Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
Ryoji Sawa
2021doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021015 +[Abstract](1751) +[HTML](556) +[PDF](904.5KB)
"Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game
Segismundo S. Izquierdo and Luis R. Izquierdo
2021doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021018 +[Abstract](1069) +[HTML](508) +[PDF](2093.37KB)
Large deviations and Stochastic stability in Population Games
Mathias Staudigl, Srinivas Arigapudi and William H. Sandholm
2021doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021021 +[Abstract](944) +[HTML](603) +[PDF](4039.34KB)
Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm
Jonathan Newton and William H. Sandholm
2021doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021029 +[Abstract](609) +[HTML](227) +[PDF](409.21KB)
Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory
Ross Cressman and Vlastimil Křivan
2021doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021030 +[Abstract](1003) +[HTML](380) +[PDF](406.64KB)
Schelling redux: An evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation
Emin Dokumacı and William H. Sandholm
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022006 +[Abstract](315) +[HTML](115) +[PDF](10458.59KB)
A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids
Karla Flores-Zarur and William Olvera-Lopez
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022007 +[Abstract](270) +[HTML](98) +[PDF](278.47KB)
On the impact of the Covid-19 health crisis on GDP forecasting: An empirical approach
Gabriel Illanes, Ernesto Mordecki and Andrés Sosa
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022008 +[Abstract](175) +[HTML](73) +[PDF](315.05KB)
Tributes to Bill Sandholm
Dai Zusai, Ryoji Sawa, Man Wah Cheung, Ratul Lahkar and Jiabin Wu
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022009 +[Abstract](409) +[HTML](82) +[PDF](753.17KB)
Opening the source code: The threat of forking
Andrea Seidl and Stefan Wrzaczek
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022010 +[Abstract](149) +[HTML](41) +[PDF](1436.32KB)
Gene subset selection using fuzzy statistical dependence technique and binary bat algorithm
Mohammed Sabah Mahmoud, Fatima Mahmood Hasan and Omar Saber Qasim
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022011 +[Abstract](72) +[HTML](44) +[PDF](346.66KB)
Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
Aradhana Narang and A. J. Shaiju
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022012 +[Abstract](74) +[HTML](30) +[PDF](401.13KB)
Relative entropy and envy-free allocation
Lonnie Turpin, Jr., Kelli Bruchhaus, Keith Credo and Gerard Ornas, Jr.
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022013 +[Abstract](84) +[HTML](23) +[PDF](364.94KB)
Stress-strength reliability with dependent variables based on copula function
Mohammad Bolbolian Ghalibaf
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022014 +[Abstract](84) +[HTML](61) +[PDF](369.07KB)
On two-player games with pure strategies on intervals $ [a, \; b] $ and comparisons with the two-player, two-strategy matrix case
Zahra Gambarova and Dionysius Glycopantis
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022015 +[Abstract](88) +[HTML](26) +[PDF](3086.93KB)
The dynamics of fitness and wealth distributions — a stochastic game-theoretic model
Sylvain Gibaud and Jörgen Weibull
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022016 +[Abstract](1) +[HTML](1) +[PDF](774.3KB)
On the symmetry relation between different characteristic functions for additively separable cooperative games
Ekaterina Gromova and Kirill Savin
2022doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022017 +[Abstract](2) +[HTML](1) +[PDF](372.97KB)
Pure and Random strategies in differential game with incomplete informations
Pierre Cardaliaguet, Chloé Jimenez and Marc Quincampoix
2014, 1(3) : 363-375 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.363 +[Abstract](4599) +[PDF](386.0KB) Cited By(13)
Existence of the uniform value in zero-sum repeated games with a more informed controller
Fabien Gensbittel, Miquel Oliu-Barton and Xavier Venel
2014, 1(3) : 411-445 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.411 +[Abstract](4456) +[PDF](550.1KB) Cited By(13)
Games with nested constraints given by a level structure
Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez and Miguel Vargas-Valencia
2018, 5(2) : 95-107 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018007 +[Abstract](5615) +[HTML](371) +[PDF](386.75KB) Cited By(11)
Approachability, regret and calibration: Implications and equivalences
Vianney Perchet
2014, 1(2) : 181-254 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.181 +[Abstract](4945) +[PDF](897.5KB) Cited By(10)
General limit value in dynamic programming
Jérôme Renault
2014, 1(3) : 471-484 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.471 +[Abstract](4665) +[PDF](385.9KB) Cited By(10)
Turnpike properties of approximate solutions of dynamic discrete time zero-sum games
Alexander J. Zaslavski
2014, 1(2) : 299-330 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.299 +[Abstract](3598) +[PDF](396.9KB) Cited By(9)
Reversibility and oscillations in zero-sum discounted stochastic games
Sylvain Sorin and Guillaume Vigeral
2015, 2(1) : 103-115 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2015.2.103 +[Abstract](4312) +[PDF](364.9KB) Cited By(8)
Robust portfolio decisions for financial institutions
Ioannis Baltas, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos
2018, 5(2) : 61-94 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018006 +[Abstract](6763) +[HTML](567) +[PDF](721.98KB) Cited By(8)
Critical transitions and Early Warning Signals in repeated Cooperation Games
Christian Hofer, Georg Jäger and Manfred Füllsack
2018, 5(3) : 223-230 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018014 +[Abstract](6049) +[HTML](572) +[PDF](384.4KB) Cited By(8)
Structure of approximate solutions of dynamic continuous time zero-sum games
Alexander J. Zaslavski
2014, 1(1) : 153-179 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.153 +[Abstract](3589) +[PDF](431.0KB) Cited By(8)
Causal discovery in machine learning: Theories and applications
Ana Rita Nogueira, João Gama and Carlos Abreu Ferreira
2021, 8(3) : 203-231 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021008 +[Abstract](4752) +[HTML](1146) +[PDF](772.97KB) PDF Downloads(1606)
On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in strategic-form games
Junichi Minagawa
2020, 7(2) : 97-104 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2020006 +[Abstract](1945) +[HTML](200) +[PDF](319.11KB) PDF Downloads(1080)
Replicator dynamics: Old and new
Sylvain Sorin
2020, 7(4) : 365-386 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2020028 +[Abstract](2151) +[HTML](614) +[PDF](488.56KB) PDF Downloads(666)
The Solow-Swan model with endogenous population growth
Gaston Cayssials and Santiago Picasso
2020, 7(3) : 197-208 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2020014 +[Abstract](3121) +[HTML](312) +[PDF](965.23KB) PDF Downloads(639)
Robust portfolio decisions for financial institutions
Ioannis Baltas, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos
2018, 5(2) : 61-94 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018006 +[Abstract](6763) +[HTML](567) +[PDF](721.98KB) PDF Downloads(599)
A regularization interpretation of the proximal point method for weakly convex functions
Tim Hoheisel, Maxime Laborde and Adam Oberman
2020, 7(1) : 79-96 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2020005 +[Abstract](2141) +[HTML](227) +[PDF](401.62KB) PDF Downloads(579)
Market games and walrasian equilibria
Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno-García
2020, 7(1) : 65-77 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2020004 +[Abstract](2772) +[HTML](263) +[PDF](374.59KB) PDF Downloads(531)
Large deviations and Stochastic stability in Population Games
Mathias Staudigl, Srinivas Arigapudi and William H. Sandholm
2021 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021021 +[Abstract](944) +[HTML](603) +[PDF](4039.34KB) PDF Downloads(493)
Structural change and economic dynamics: Rethinking from the complexity approach
Martha G. Alatriste-Contreras, Juan Gabriel Brida and Martin Puchet Anyul
2019, 6(2) : 87-106 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2019007 +[Abstract](4875) +[HTML](423) +[PDF](328.97KB) PDF Downloads(456)
Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
Ryoji Sawa
2021 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2021015 +[Abstract](1751) +[HTML](556) +[PDF](904.5KB) PDF Downloads(452)

2021 CiteScore: 3.3

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